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Rosa Mucignat 
Perspective and Historical Knowledge: Magris, Sebald, and Pamuk  
 
Abstract:  
Since the Renaissance, perspective has been used as a metaphor to describe both the 
possibility of depicting reality objectively, and the fact that all representations are limited and 
subjective. The same ambivalence is carried over in the notion of historical perspective, 
which serves to articulate both relativist and realist arguments about our interpretations of the 
past. This article analyses the tension between these two positions, and the way this tension is 
constructed, and in part resolved, in visual terms in three recent narratives of place and 
memory: Magris’ Danube, Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn, and Pamuk’s Istanbul. 
 
 
A great deal of twentieth-century critical thought has been based on a pessimistic view of 
truth and rationality that achieved its classic expression in the denigration of vision and its 
hegemonic role in the modern era. One of the main targets of what Martin Jay has called 
“antiocularcentric discourse” has been the idea that it is possible to achieve an objective, 
totalizing and rationalized view of the past. Historicism recognizes that any understanding we 
develop of the past is conditioned by our own particular historical situation. Post-structuralist 
theories raise a similar point by drawing attention to the role of discourses and systems of 
power in producing knowledge. Finally, deconstruction is even more radical in arguing that 
the objects of the past, as all other objects, have no stable meanings or identities. Yet the fact 
that we have no access to a stable past does not in itself imply that we must give up the 
possibility of objective knowledge. A powerful pragmatic answer to the modern form of 
skepticism exhibited, among others, by Hayden White, came from Arnaldo Momigliano: “As 
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we cannot do better than studying change from a changing point of view,” he wrote, “there is 
a point in doing it well” (67). Sound historical practice, and not some transcendental idea of 
truth, is the only defence against a debilitating relativism. The realization that no single point 
of view can embrace the complexity of a historical narrative should lead to a recalibration of 
perspective and not to its wholesale rejection. Momigliano here employs a visual metaphor 
that has become emblematic of the “scopic regime” of modernity: perspective and the 
attending concept of point of view. From its inception in the Italian Renaissance, perspective 
has stood both for the possibility of seeing the world as an objective whole and for the 
inevitable fact that we can only view things from a particular angle. The success of 
perspective as a cognitive metaphor has perhaps outstripped even its impact on the arts. 
Pervasive to the point of being commonplace, perspectival metaphors today might seem 
entirely naturalized and neutral. This article shows how three recent narratives of place and 
memory by Claudio Magris, W.G. Sebald, and Orhan Pamuk challenge and revise centuries-
old association of vision with thought in response to the postmodern debate on historical 
hermeneutics.  
Since antiquity, artists were well aware that faraway objects could be shown smaller 
than those nearer at hand to give an illusion of depth, but this principle was not applied 
systematically, following geometrical principles, until the Renaissance. Renaissance artists 
thought of perspective as a series of rules and techniques for constructing images, which, as 
Erwin Panofsky states, relied on “rather bold abstractions from reality.” This is because linear 
perspective assumes that we see “with a single and immobile eye,” and that a picture 
constructed in this way as an open window “can pass for an adequate reproduction of our 
optical image” (Panofsky, Perspective 29). Yet, as James Elkins has shown, the modern 
understanding of perspective privileges aspects of systematic ordering of space and realism 
of representation, obscuring the self-conscious constructedness and indifference to 
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geometrical precision of much Renaissance and later practice. In particular, Elkins draws 
attention to the “fossilization of perspective” since the sixteenth century, noting how its 
devaluation as an artistic practice made it more malleable to metaphorical use, particularly in 
the new philosophical discourse of subjectivity which posited vision as homologous to 
thought (217-60). Indeed, throughout the modern period, the central assumption about 
perspective was that “the science of geometrical optics corresponded in a real way to the 
central facts of the visual process” (Kemp 165). The rigorous application of the laws of 
perspective was taken to guarantee a truthful and coherent field of representation that could 
replicate and even improve our visual experience of nature. The “truth” of perspective, 
however, depended on an increasingly strict discipline for viewing that fixed the location, 
direction, and mobility of the gaze and used framing devices to cast an artificial grid or plane 
of delineation over the blur of light, shade, colors and curves of natural perception. 
Subsequently, linear perspective became so strongly identified with Enlightenment thought 
that it is still frequently taken as emblematic of the unrelenting rationalism and search for 
“clear and distinct” perceptions associated with Descartes’s epistemology. In his seminars on 
the gaze, Jacques Lacan famously linked fifteenth-century perspective to “the institution of a 
Cartesian subject, which is itself a sort of geometral point, a point of perspective” (86).1 This 
view developed out of Panofsky’s argument that “the history of perspective may be 
understood…as a triumph of the distancing-denying human struggle for control; it is as much 
a consolidation and systematization of the external world, as an extension of the domain of 
the self” (Perspective 67-68). But while Panofsky continued to uphold humanist values of 
fact-finding and critical interpretation, post-structuralist thinkers have taken perspective as 
emblematic of the strategies of representation and subject-formation of Western modernity, 
 
1 Twentieth-century theories about “Cartesian perspectivism” have been strongly criticized 
from an art-historical point of view by Elkins and Lyle Massey in her study of anamorphosis.   
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which are in turn linked to the structures of patriarchy and colonial power. Rejected by 
postmodernist aesthetics and by the avant-gardes, the cognitive model of perspective made a 
perhaps unexpected comeback in more recent scholarship. According to Claudio Guillén, 
“the cry for ‘perspective’ often expresses, in fact, a desperate longing for order in a cluttered, 
helter-skelter world” (370). Fredric Jameson highlighted the emancipatory potential of 
perspectivalism in his call for a new “aesthetic of cognitive mapping…in which we may 
again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a 
capacity to act and struggle” (54).  
Clearly the issue is not just one of spatial orientation but also of social and personal 
identity, and how the subject makes sense of historical change. There are discordant views as 
to when perspectival metaphors entered the discourse of history. Panofsky argued that the 
Humanists’ awareness of the “historical distance” separating antiquity from the contemporary 
world is “comparable to the visual distance between the eye and the object” (“Classical 
Mythology” 274).2 Thus, at the same time as perspective was developed to represent reality 
objectively, European culture also began to visualize the past as distinct from the present. But 
while it allowed for the specific characters of the past to emerge, historical distance also 
undercut the possibility of truly understanding it from the standpoint of the present. This is 
why Panofsky talks of a melancholic strain in Renaissance art and culture, which laments but 
ultimately relies on the distance between the present and the past. A different account of the 
“temporalization of perspective” places it in the wake of the French Revolution, when the 
fast-changing political reality forced historians to consider their position vis-à-vis events of 
the past, which had to be interpreted in light of new social and political circumstances as well 
as newly defined epistemological standards (Koselleck 139). The discovery of the past, even 
the very recent one, as “other” posed methodological challenges that were met by Romantic 
 
2 See also Ginzburg, Wooden Eyes, 149.  
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historicism with an aspiration to “resurrect the past” and reconstruct the everyday life of past 
ages through imagination and narrative (Rigney 4). On the other hand, the historicist tradition 
inaugurated by Wilhelm von Humboldt professed that “historical truth is, as it were, rather 
like the clouds which take shape for the eye only at a distance.”3 As Mark Salber Philips has 
noted, “since the late eighteenth century at least, Europeans have seen some form of 
distancing as bound up with historical knowledge. Yet the same condition of estrangement 
also produces a strong countercurrent, encouraging a widespread desire to recapture a feeling 
of historical intimacy and connected tradition” (2).  
Whether it began in the Renaissance or after the French Revolution, the extension of 
the perspectival model to history has provided a set of metaphors that continue to guide our 
discussion today. Without implying a precise genealogy, this article puts forward a 
comparative analysis of perspectival metaphors in Claudio Magris’ Danubio (Danube, 1986); 
Die Ringe des Saturn: Eine Englische Wallfahrt by W.G. Sebald (The Rings of Saturn, 1995); 
and Orhan Pamuk’s Istanbul: Memories and the City (2003).4 These texts, I argue, react to 
the postmodern crisis of historical consciousness by discovering a new hermeneutic potential 
in the perspectival model, beyond the absolutism-relativism opposition. It is not unreasonable 
to surmise that Magris, Sebald and Pamuk are well aware of contemporary developments in 
history and theory. Both Magris and Sebald have had distinguished academic careers in 
German studies at a time when, under the influence of New Historicism and Foucaldian 
theory, questions of history and context were prominent in the field. Pamuk’s own critical 
 
3 From von Humboldt’s 1821 lecture “On the Historian’s Task” (58). Hollander, Paul and 
Peters place the origins of the metaphor even later in the “visually-oriented” scholarship of 
Huizinga (2).  
4 I shall refer to Magris’ original Italian and Sebald’s German, but, being ignorant of Turkish, 
I will rely on Maureen Freely’s translation of Istanbul.  
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works, including his 2009 Charles Eliot Norton Lectures, frequently reflect on the dialectic of 
distance and proximity between author and the narrated world.5 All three writers raise 
questions about the accessibility of the past through textualizations and the distancing from 
real lived experience and suffering that this mediation might cause. Such reflections take the 
shape of stories about space and in particular about problems of scale and point of view in 
landscape painting and mapmaking. Their post-imperial fictions are grounded in specific 
geographies (respectively, the former Austro-Hungarian territories along the river Danube, 
the Suffolk coast, and the city of Istanbul). At the center of all three is a narrator figure 
closely resembling or explicitly identified with the author, who undertakes his journey in the 
slow, unhurried pace of a wanderer or pilgrim (as suggested by Sebald’s original subtitle) 
through seemingly familiar landscapes, thickly overlaid with digressions on history, literature, 
art, personal reminiscences and the life of notable people associated with the place. Part 
memoirs, part cultural histories, part fiction, these hybrid narratives use the travelogue format 
to bring to the surface the traces of a traumatic past: the dissolution of the Austrian Empire 
and the rise of nationalism and Nazi-Fascism in Danubio; industrialization and the atrocities 
of colonialism in Die Ringe des Saturn; and the “catastrophic success” of the Kemalist 
revolution, which set out to erase the multicultural heritage of Ottoman Empire in Istanbul.6 
Magris, Sebald and Pamuk test the limits of history as they travel across England, the 
Mitteleuropa and Turkey to explore the memories and ruins of the recent past, negotiating 
their perspective between distanced, rationalizing vision and contemplative immersion in the 
flux of history.  
 
5 The lectures were published as The Naïve and Sentimental Novelist in 2010. On the impact 
of New Historicism on German studies see Holub.  
6 “A catastrophic success” is how Geoffrey Lewis defined the Turkish language reform, 
which eliminated all Arabic grammatical features and introduced the Latin alphabet.  
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Claudio Magris is a professor of German, critic and writer living in Trieste. An expert 
on Austrian literature, Magris wrote Danubio as the exploration of a cultural space where 
different languages, ethnicities, and religions have coexisted for centuries.7 The narrative 
follows the course of Europe’s longest river from its sources in Southern Germany through 
Austria, Hungary, Serbia, and Bulgaria, ending at its sprawling delta on the Romanian coast 
of the Black Sea. Clearly, the existence of the Danube as a physical reality is unquestionable, 
yet Magris is quietly dismissive of anything that presents itself as solid, whether it is national 
identity, language, history, or geography itself. Seen in a bird’s-eye view or on a 
geographical map, the river has an identifiable beginning and an end, and can be grasped in 
its entirety. But looking closer, things are less clear-cut. Magris takes its upon himself to 
solve once and for all the centuries-old controversy over the site of the Danube’s source, 
disputed between two small town in the Black Forest: Donaueschingen, at the confluence of 
the Breg and the Brigach, and Furtwangen, where the Breg flows from. Surveying the area on 
foot, he makes the strange discovery that “l’acqua che irrora il prato da cui sgorga la Breg 
viene da un tubo, piantato dritto nel terreno” (26; “the water that drenches the meadow in 
which rises the source of the Breg comes out of a pipe stuck upright in the earth,” Creagh 27). 
Thus the river’s mythical source would be neither the monumental fountain at 
Donaueschingen nor the spring at Furtwangen, but an anonymous pipe that draws off the 
melted snow from a farmyard a few meters uphill. The closer the point of view, the harder it 
is to pinpoint exactly the spot where water and earth separate and the river begins. The open 
space of the estuary is even less readable: in that mixture of land, river, and sea water “la foce 
non c’è, il Danubio non si vede, i rigagnoli fangosi tra le canne e le sabbie non è detto 
giungano da Furtwangen”  (472; “there is no river-mouth, one does not see the Danube. 
 
7 On Magris’ “triestinità” and the literary heritage of the city see Pizzi 37-60. On the Danube 
region as a site of cultural hybridization see Marcel Cornis-Pope with Nikola Pektovic.  
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There is no assurance that the muddy creeks among the canebrakes and dunes come from 
Furtwangen,” Creagh 400). The river’s meandering flow defies systematic description and 
becomes the symbol of a reality irreducible to linguistic and epistemological structures.  
The complex geography of central and Eastern Europe has often been imagined as a 
realm in between, where continents and civilizations mingle. As Michał Czorycki reminds us, 
“the motifs of ambiguity and confusion recurring in many depictions of the area set its 
presumed ‘formlessness’ against Western ‘solidity’ ” (78). Characteristically, Magris taps 
into this discourse of otherness and gives it a positive turn, praising the formlessness and 
disorder of Eastern Europe over the rigidity of the Western, particularly German, self-identity 
and worldview. The narrator of Danube pokes fun at Ernst Neweklowsky, an Austrian 
engineer who devoted his life to compiling an encyclopedic study of the Upper section of the 
Danube. For Magris, Neweklowsky embodies that aspect of the human mind which 
constantly strives to eliminate dissonance and achieve a total synthesis. The Engineer “è un 
epigono non indegno di Hegel o di Clausewitz, sa che il mondo esiste per essere ordinato e 
affinché i suoi dispersi dettagli siano connessi dal pensiero” (67; “is a not unworthy disciple 
of Hegel or Clausewitz: he knows that the world exists to be put in order, and so that its 
scattered details may be bound together by thought,” Creagh 60).  
His search for order and comprehensiveness is shared in part by Magris’s own textual 
persona – he too likes to gather dates, names, facts, and citations, comparing and connecting 
all. Magris, however, is at least as interested in constructing a system as he is in exposing its 
faults. Indeed, any attempt to standardize is bound to generate exceptions, just as archives 
draw attention not only to what is there but also to what is left out. “Ogni esperienza è il 
risultato di un tenace metodo,” remarks Magris early on. “È nelle classificazioni che la vita 
rivela il suo struggente balenìo, nei protocolli che cercano di catalogarla e ne pongono in tal 
modo in evidenza l’irriducibile residuo di mistero e di incanto” (13; “Every experience is the 
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result of a stringent method…It is in classifications that life flashes through so tantalizingly, 
in the registers that attempt to catalogue it and in so doing expose its irreducible residuum of 
mystery and enchantment,” 17). In a Kantian vein, Magris argues that there is no experience 
without theory, and that preformed ideas and hypotheses are the conditions without which 
nothing can appear. Yet a priori paradigms are to be valued not for their explicatory power 
but for their inevitable failure to hold the enthralling variety of life into a unified scheme. Our 
constantly frustrated desire to unify and order phenomena is more than an interpretive 
strategy or a cognitive bias: it is part of how we perceive reality itself.  
Later the same concept is illustrated with a perspectival metaphor that, as might be 
expected, is Cartesian in character. The narrator and his travel companions visit Neuburg, the 
ancient capital of the Palatinate, where a young Descartes is said to have resided when the 
overall plan of his philosophy prodigiously appeared to him in three prophetic dreams.8 
While his friends visit the town’s Gymnasium, named after the illustrious visitor, the narrator 
falls behind and looses himself in contemplation of the beautiful Maddalena, one of the group. 
Her flawless silhouette, he observes, mirrors her inner qualities of goodness and kindness, 
proving that appearances can sometimes reveal the essence. He insists:  
 
Il regno del visibile va misurato con squadra e compasso…Solo la precisa 
ricognizione del visibile permette di giungere ai suoi bordi e di rivolgere uno sguardo 
oltre quei confini…Anche quella luce e quel silenzio che giungono da una fonte 




8 According to other sources Descartes was in nearby Ulm. For details see Sebba.    
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The kingdom of the visible should be measured with set-square and compass...Only 
the precise identification of what is visible enables us to reach its confines and direct 
our gaze beyond...Even that light and that silence from a hidden source, even the 
beyond and the invisible, are clear and geometrical, abhorring a blur. (Creagh 95) 
 
The entry point into reality’s mysterious depths must always be the surface, which we, as 
humans, are irresistibly drawn to analyze and reduce to a geometrical order. “Set-square and 
compass” are the tools of the perspective painter, who stands at a distance and measures the 
position of each object in a systematic way. But just as the process of indexing highlights 
missing items, so accurate perspectives encourage the viewer to peer beyond the visible and 
look for the light’s “hidden source.” Magris professes disdain for imprecision and deliberate 
vagueness, suggesting that even the most unfathomable phenomena for which we have but 
hazy terms (he talks of “destiny,” “aura,” “the invisible”) demand the application of clear and 
distinct thinking.  
This makes a striking contrasts with Magris’ own way of proceeding in Danube, 
whose loose structure juxtaposes thoughts, facts and anecdotes without any hierarchical or 
logical order, just as the Danube itself collects its waters from different sources, unconcerned 
with political and ethnic boundaries. Magris’ geographical observations frequently call forth 
questions about collective memory and the shape of history. An exhibition on the Turkish 
siege of Vienna of 1683 leads the narrator to reflect on the meaning of his own journey for 
ideals of universalism. Does the flow of the Danube represent the interconnectedness of 
European nations, or is it a painful reminder of their inability to live together in peace? 
Magris is cautiously optimistic:  
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Passeggiando fra quei trofei di vittoria che sono anche relitti di un naufragio, il 
visitatore si sente figlio e erede di una storia unitaria nei suoi frammenti, pur dispersi 
come oggetti di un campo saccheggiato, di una storia fatta di croci e di mezzelune, di 
cordoni di cappuccini e di turbanti. (208) 
 
Walking among these victory trophies, which are also the relics of a shipwreck, the 
visitor feels himself rather to be the son and heir of a history unified in its fragments, 
though these are scattered like objects in a pillaged encampment; a history composed 
of crescents as well as crosses, of Capuchin cords and of turbans. (Creagh 177) 
 
Depending on the point of view, the ruined Turkish camp recreated in the Vienna exhibition 
represents the Austrians’ victory or the Ottomans’ defeat. At the moment when it is poised to 
vanish in fragments or become hostage to partisan views, this remote but still resonant event 
is reconstituted into a meaningful whole. In the rescued objects on show at the museum, 
Magris reads an alternative history that cannot be explained solely in terms of conflict but is 
recast as shared heritage of both Europeans and Turks. In such a vision, indebted to Ivo 
Andrić’s bridge metaphor, the history of humanity is conceived of as a unified whole that 
subsumes ruins and triumphs under a superior universal scheme. Ten years on, faced with the 
disaster of the Balkan wars, Magris still refused to recant the “true fables” of supranational 
humanism, convinced that “the nationalist fever…does not own history and the future.”9 
But this is only one side of Danubio. Magris’ narrative is energized by the tension 
between distance and proximity, analysis and synthesis, panoramic view and minute 
observation. Magris places himself at the tension point between Cartesian perspectivism and 
 
9 “Nemmeno i furori nazionalistici…hanno davanti a sé la storia e l’avvenire”, in “Il mondo 
nel falò di Sarajevo.” L’Unità, 15 March 1996, p. 7.  
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a form of seeing that is sensitive to the fragmentariness and uncertainty of experience. 
Throughout the book, overconfidence in rationality and systematic thinking is associated with 
modern totalitarianism and its disasters, while tolerance for contradictions and ambiguities is 
a feature of what Magris calls “spirito austriaco” (89; “the Austrian spirit,” Creagh 78). The 
multi-ethnic, multilingual Habsburg Empire is presented as a precursor of postmodern 
transnational identities. In this idealized picture, the enemies of old Austria-Hungary are all 
forms of totalizing visions and fanatic beliefs, from Napoleon to Hegel, from Heidegger to 
National Socialism: “contro il totalitarismo ideologico la tradizione austriaca difende il 
dettaglio sensibile, il particolare vagabondo, la vita irriducibile al sistema” (91; “against 
ideological totalitarianism the Austrian tradition defends the tangible detail, the unique 
particular, that side of life which cannot be reduced to a system,” Creagh 80). Magris’ 
narrative is a eulogy of small-scale, close-range observations. What he calls the “Danubian 
civilization” is seen through multiple lenses: personal memories, impressions of travel, 
literary citations and references, oral testimonies and sites of memory.  
Not even Vienna, the putative center of this Danubian world, receives an overall 
establishing shot; instead, it appears as a collection of odd fragments: a life-sized statue of the 
writer Peter Altenberg sitting at his regular table in the Cafè Central; Wittgenstein’s house, 
now the Embassy of Bulgaria, on the Kundmanngasse; a guard hunting wild rabbits on the 
grounds of the Zentralfriedhof. At the Landtmann coffeehouse, a friend of the narrator 
remembers hearing the literary critic György Lukács give a political speech there in 1952. 
Magris is struck by the absurdity of the situation – Lukács lecturing leisurely café patrons 
about the greatness of the USSR. He presents this as anecdotal evidence of the split between 
the modern and postmodern worldviews, which peculiarly he does not see succeeding one 
another in the expected chronological order:  
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Lukács è il pensatore moderno per eccellenza, che ragiona per categorie forti, 
inquadra il mondo in un sistema e instaura, al di sopra dei bisogni, dei fermi valori. 
Vienna è la città del post-moderno, nella quale la realtà cede alla propria 
rappresentazione e all’apparenza, le categorie forti si allentano, l’universale...si 
dissolve nell’effimero. (220) 
 
Lukács is the modern thinker par excellence, he reasons in terms of strong categories, 
sees the world in terms of a system and establishes firm values over and above 
necessities. Vienna is the city of the post-modern, in which reality yields to the 
depiction of itself and of appearances, the strong categories weaken, and the 
universal...dissolves into the ephemeral. (Creagh, 188)  
 
Vienna stubbornly refuses to keep up with modernity, and by being backwards it ends up 
being ahead of its time. This kind of temporal inversion is typical of what Magris understands 
as the postmodern mutation, which has abandoned ideas about linear history and stages of 
development dating back to the nineteenth century. Vienna represents the awareness that is 
both pre- and postmodern of the relativity of all experience, including time. Past, present and 
future no longer take up fixed positions on the timeline of history but are reshuffled 
according the observer’s subjective frame of reference. Generalising from Ernst Bloch’s 
famous argument that not all people exist in the same “now,” Magris observes that events 
which occurred hundreds of years ago (such as the Turkish siege) might be felt as relevant to 
current affairs, while more recent ones seem infinitely distant and forgotten (39). 
Further along the river, we meet Lukács once more in his native Budapest, which 
Magris describes as “the most beautiful city on the Danube” (Creagh 261). There, the concept 
of contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous is explicated in more detail with an 
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architectural example. The palaces and avenues of modern Budapest are the legacy of a vast 
program of public works that began in the mid-nineteenth century, following the creation of 
the Dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Magris, writing in 1986 when Hungary was still part 
of the Eastern bloc, speaks of the contrast between the theatrical flair of the monuments in the 
old capital and the stagnant, provincial atmosphere that hangs over the whole of central 
Europe. Maybe Europe is over, and its cities are perhaps nothing but the archaeological sites 
of a bygone modernity. Still, this declining world enjoys a light-hearted ease that is denied to 
more successful nations:  
 
Ogni erede asburgico è un vero uomo del futuro, perché ha imparato, prima di tanti 
altri, a vivere senza un futuro, nell’interruzione di ogni continuità storica, e cioè non a 
vivere ma a sopravvivere. Ma lungo questi splendidi boulevards e in un mondo così 
vitale e signorile, che non mostra la malinconia dei paesi dell’Est, anche la 
sopravvivenza è amabile e seducente, magnanima e forse, a tratti, quasi felice. (313) 
 
Every heir of the Hapsburg era is a true man of the future, because he learnt, earlier 
than most others, to live without a future, in the absence of any historical continuity; 
and that is, not to live but to survive. But along these splendid boulevards, in a world 
as lively and elegant as this, a world which does not display the melancholy of the 
Eastern Bloc countries, even survival is charming and seductive, magnanimous and 
maybe, at times, almost happy. (Creagh, 266) 
 
Living, as it were, a posthumous existence, the “Danubian civilization” has emancipated 
itself from the grand narratives of progress and mastery, and survives pleasantly enough 
through its own decline. Forsaking the epistemological imperatives of modernity for a more 
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comfortable stance of relativism looks like an attractive solution. Still, there is something 
paralysing in the self-satisfied withdrawal from history diagnosed by Magris. The atmosphere 
of nostalgia and inevitability smothers any sense of freedom and agency. Once the “set-
square and compass” of Cartesian perspectivism have been discarded, there is nothing left to 
orient the subject and to help reconstruct space and time as a composite whole. Yet to argue 
that the representational codes of today are no longer endowed with the self-assurance of 
earlier moments of Western history is not necessarily to dismiss perspective and critical 
distance wholesale. The rich and elaborated narrative of Danubio represents Magris’ effort of 
mapping postmodern space in a way that neither gives in to the notion that reality is 
unknowable nor falls back to old ideas of transparency and mimesis. Instead, Magris 
proposes an updated, if not new, perspectival aesthetics that articulates the relationship of 
individuals to the totality in which they find themselves, and mediates a comprehensive 
understanding of history as made up of catastrophes and progress all together.  
European history, tragedy and survival are also at the center of W.G. Sebald’s work, 
although the levity of Magris’ narrative voice is replaced by a more somber tone. Die Ringe 
des Saturn has been described as Sebald’s most critical engagement with modernity and its 
modes of knowledge. J.J. Lang notes that “the walking body and its performances 
constitute…the locus of resistance to modernity” in this text, which stages a contrast between 
the inadequacy of maps and other forms of representation compared to the embodied 
experience of place (133). Like Danube, it is an exploration of place (the Suffolk coast), a 
pilgrimage on foot in search of traces of events, people, and ways of life of the past, which 
merges real-life memories and documents with fiction. In addition to that, Sebald makes large 
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use of images that are reproduced in the text, uncaptioned, with a tantalizing effect for the 
reader.10  
One of the first images the reader encounters is of the famous painting by Rembrandt 
The Anatomy Lesson, held in the Mauritshuis museum in The Hague. Sebald comes to it 
through a chain of associations that take him from his hospital bed in Norwich to 
seventeenth-century physician and thinker Sir Thomas Browne, who lived in Norwich and 
travelled to Leiden to study medicine, and might have been present at the public lecture by 
Dutch surgeon Nicolaas Tulp that Rembrandt depicted. These interconnections have the 
effect of telescoping the distance between these seemingly remote events and the narrative 
present. Rembrandt’s use of perspective in this vast painting contributes to enhance the sense 
of proximity and participation:  
 
Stehen wir heute im Mauritshuis vor dem gut zwei mal eineinhalb Meter messenden 
Anatomiegemälde Rembrandts, so stehen wir an der Stelle derer, die im Waagebouw 
seinerzeit dem Vorgang der Sezierung gefolgt sind, und meinen zu sehen, was diese 
gesehen haben. (23) 
 
If we stand today in the Mauritshuis before the canvas, measuring over 1.5 by 1.5 
meter, of Rembrandt’s The Anatomy Lesson we are standing precisely where those 
who were present at the dissection in the Waagebouw stood, and we believe that we 
see what they saw then. (Hulse 13; translation modified)  
 
 
10 A growing body of literature concentrates on Sebald’s use of images, especially 
photography. For an overview, see Long 46-70.  
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The body of an executed criminal known as Aris Kindt, stretched out on the dissection table, 
occupies center stage. Its greenish color, bloated chest, and inanimate face create a 
gruesomely realistic spectacle. The left forearm has been cut open to reveal its anatomical 
structure: using forceps, Dr Tulp pulls on the flexor muscles that make fingers curl, while 
demonstrating this same delicate movement with his own left hand. The structure and 
functions of the hand, and in particular gripping mechanisms, were connected to the tradition, 
dating back to Aristotle, that considered this complex instrument as proof the superiority 
accorded by God to humankind (Bruyn, Haak et al. 185). Sebald stresses how the anatomy 
lesson was a spectacle (“Schauspiel”) held in a large public hall, the Waagebouw, and 
attended by a paying audience. Its purported aim was to demonstrate the “unerschrockener 
Forschungsdrang der neuen Wissenschaft” (22; “undaunted investigative zeal of the new 
sciences,” Hulse 12). The anatomic accuracy of Rembrands’ painting has been long debated, 
including by physicians, particularly as the dissected arm appears unnaturally twisted and 
larger than the right arm. Some critics accept the view that the arm was not observed from an 
actual body but copied from an anatomical illustration at a later stage (Bruyn, Haak et al. 
186). For Sebald, this constitutes a deliberate act of sabotage. Rembrandt seemingly offers a 
faithful representation of the dead man’s body, but the obvious flaws of what should be the 
focal point of the image undermine the very notion of scientific knowledge and observation. 
He alone, Sebald says, is free of the “starren cartesischen Blick” (27; “rigid Cartesian gaze”) 
that render the surgeons blind to pain of their “victim.”  
Sebald notes that, when looking at the canvas, we are under the impression of seeing 
what an eyewitness present at the scene would have seen. But is this really true? Indeed, 
Sebald claims that “ist es fraglich, ob diesen Leib je in Wahrheit einer gesehen hat” (22; “it is 
debatable whether anyone ever really saw that body,” Hulse 12). Strikingly, none of the men 
present, not even the anatomist himself, is looking directly at it. Most of them appear to be 
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concentrating on a large volume that lays open on the bottom right, which has been identified 
as an anatomical atlas (Heckscher 67-70). According to Sebald, Rembrandt wishes to suggest 
that these men of science are not as committed to the empirical method as they appear to be. 
Instead of observing reality, they prefer to rest their eyes on the textbook  
 
…in dem die entsetzliche Körperlichkeit reduziert ist auf ein Diagramm, auf ein 
Schema des Menschen, wie es dem passionierten, an jenem Januarmorgen im  
Waaggebouw angeblich gleichfalls anwesenden Amateuranatomen René Descartes 
vorschwebte. (22) 
 
...in which the appalling physical facts are reduced to a diagram, a schematic plan of 
the human being, such as envisaged by the enthusiastic amateur anatomist René 
Descartes, who was also, so it is said, present that January morning in the 
Waaggebouw. (Hulse 12) 
 
Francis Baker, whose analysis of the painting stands behind Sebald’s interpretation, affirms 
that this dissolution of the corporeal into the textual is essentially a form of abuse. “With 
what philosophical serenity,” he asks, “are these gazes able not to perceive the violent act of 
domination upon which this painting...predicates their tranquility?” (77-78).11 Sebald 
speculates that Descartes himself might have been present at Tulp’s anatomy lesson, along 
with Browne. But if Browne is Sebald’s intellectual hero, Descartes becomes the straw-man 
representative of a kind of overarching Western metanarrative that over-rationalized the 
human being and devalued the body and emotions:  
 
 
11 Sebald’s indebtedness to Barker in this respect has been demonstrated by Pic.   
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Bekanntlich lehrte Descartes in einem der Hauptkapitel der Geschichte der 
Unterwerfung, daß man absehen muß von dem unbegreiflichen Fleisch und hin auf 
die in uns bereits angelegte Maschine, auf das, was man vollkommen verstehen, 
restlos für die Arbeit nutzbar machen und, bei allfälliger Störung, entweder wieder 
instand setzen oder wegwerfen kann. (22)  
 
In his philosophical investigations, which form one of the principal chapters of the 
history of subjection, Descartes teaches that one should disregard the flesh, and attend 
to the machine within, to what can fully be understood, be made wholly useful for 
work, and, in the event of any fault, either repaired of discarded. (Hulse, 13) 
 
As often in contemporary philosophy, Descartes is vilified as the creator of a dualistic 
metaphysics that subjected nature to a heartless instrumental rationality and favored 
intellectual capacities over emotional ones.12 In Sebald’s interpretation, The Anatomy Lesson 
represents the contrast between the “Cartesian rigidity” of the surgeons’ gaze, which 
bypasses the human, and the embodied, emotional gaze that Rembrandt’s compassionate 
portrait solicits from the viewer. As has been noted, this reading owes much to Foucault’s 
theories on the disciplinary effect of medical knowledge. However, as always in Sebald, the 
Foucauldian language of the passage should not be taken at face value. In his study of the 
“archival logic” of Sebald’s writing,  Long has concluded that “although he clearly found 
aspects of Foucault’s descriptive analysis of power congenial…his literary work frequently 
 
12 On twentieth-century suspicion of vision and its hegemonic role in Descartes’ 
epistemology see Jay 69-82. Sorell puts forward a defense of Cartesianism that discriminates 
between Descartes’ own writings and contemporary interpretations, which, he notes “are not 
always well founded” (x).   
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dramatises a certain excess of subjectivity that is not reducible to determination by 
disciplinarity and power/knowledge” (171).   
That Sebald’s notion of subjectivity is not purely “anti-Cartesian” becomes clear 
when juxtaposing his analysis of The Anatomy Lesson with another ekphrastic moment. Later 
on in the book, the narrator remembers a trip to The Hague, where he had gone especially to 
see The Anatomy Lesson. He does not discuss that painting any further but talks at length of 
another, Jacob van Ruisdael’s View of Haarlem. Unlike the Rembrandt, which is reproduced 
twice, first in a double-page spread (14-15) and then cropped to detail overleaf, Sebald 
refrains from placing an image of Ruisdael’s painting in the text but provides a detailed 
description: 
 
Die gegen Haarlem sich hinziehende Ebene ist aus der Höhe gesehen, von den Dünen 
aus, wie im allgemeinen behauptet wird, doch ist der Eindruck einer Schau aus der 
Vogelsperspektive so stark, daß diese Seedünen ein richtiges Hügelland hätten sein 
müssen, wenn nicht gar ein kleines Gebirge. In Wahrheit ist van Ruisdael beim Malen 
natürlich nicht auf den Dünen gestanden, sondern auf einem künstlichen, ein Stück 
über der Welt imaginierten Punkt. Nur so konnte er alles zugleich sehen. (102)  
 
The flatland stretching out towards Haarlem is seen from above, from a vantage point 
generally identified as the dunes, though the sense of a bird’s-eye view is so strong 
that the dunes would have to be veritable hills or even modest mountains. The truth of 
course is that Ruisdael did not take up a position on the dunes in order to paint; his 
vantage point was an imaginary position some distance above the earth. Only in this 
way could he see it all together. (Hulse, 83)  
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Once more the perspective of a painter is used to make a point about the relationship between 
seeing and knowing. In The Anatomy Lesson, reality is brought uncomfortably close to the 
observer: the level of characterization makes it impossible to view Aris Kindt’s dead body 
merely as an anatomical sample, as “Cartesian perspectivalism” would demand.  
By contrast, the Ruisdael painting lifts us out and away from the immediacy of the 
situation, enabling a broader perspective. The contours of the landscape, surmounted by 
majestic cloud formations, are in evidence, and the human figures are barely visible. The 
image, however, is not an unmediated representation of nature. A patch of sunlight 
illuminates carefully plotted fields where the linen is spread out to bleach. Bleaching was one 
of Haarlem’s most important industries, and van Ruisdael shows the productive elements of 
the landscape in a harmonious interplay with the natural surroundings. Goethe, in his essay 
Ruisdael the Poet, praised him for his depictions of the “inhabited world” which “represent 
the past in the present,” and create images that are both “pleasing to the eye and…expressing 
an idea” (210). Sebald might have Goethe’s appraisal in mind when he sets Ruisdael’s neat 
Dutch landscape in contrast to Rembrandt’s troubling dissection.13 
Anne Fuchs has cogently argued that the soothing power of Ruisdael’s View of 
Haarlem allows the Sebaldian narrator to take “that decisive step which leads from the 
scientific concept of a fragmented nature,” symbolized by Tulp’s autopsy, “to an aesthetic 
experience of the unity of nature” (“Hauptkapitel” 129). This transition, however, is 
complicated by the consideration that there are no high hills or mountains around Haarlem, 
hence such a point of view cannot be real. Sebald leaves it at that, but the unspoken 
implication might be that all representations that release the viewer from involvement and 
offer an untroubled, open view of the world are, in a sense, illusory. Many see the trauma of 
the Holocaust as the subtext of many, if not all, of Sebald’s works. As Fuchs puts is, “it is 
 
13 It was David Ricks who brought Goethe’s essay to my attention.  
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clear that Sebald…makes a connection between European rationalism and the emergence of a 
biopolitics that made Auschwitz possible” (“Painters” 173). Perhaps Sebald thinks that there 
is but a small step from cultivating critical distance to forgetting the humanity of others.    
 At other times, however, perspectival distance is presented as a cure for the terror that 
grips the narrator when confronted with “the traces of destruction” he detects even in the 
peaceful East Anglian countryside. In fact, the walking tour or “pilgrimage” that is related in 
Die Ringe des Saturn might have been the cause of the undefined illness that takes hold of the 
narrator at the start of the narrative, leaving him in a “state of almost total immobility” (Hulse 
3). In a room on the eight floor of the hospital, he painfully drags himself to a window which 
“for some strange reason, was draped with black netting.” A photograph of such a window is 
inserted into the narrative, and Sebald goes on to explain how looking out through it assuaged 
his anxiety that “the Suffolk expanses...had now shrunk once and for all to a single, blind, 
insensate spot,” and that reality itself had “vanished forever” (Hulse 4). The black netting has 
been variously interpreted as “a portent of death” (Cooke 158) or as a trap that imprisons the 
narrator (Blacker 169). But it can also be compared to a perspectival grid. Sebald’s window 
resembles the figures used in Renaissance tracts to illustrate the essential elements of 
perspective, which “often represent an observer facing a wall or window laced with 
geometrical lines” (Elkins 9). And as Carol Jacobs has observed, it belongs to the same 
category as the Cartesian coordinate system of Rembrandt’s painting and the lines of 
Browne’s quincunx, which Sebald evokes in the same chapter (73).  
If, as I argue, the black netting corresponds to the optical device for tracing 
perspectives, its prominent place at the beginning of the book might serve to clarify the 
epistemological premise on which Sebald constructs his novel-essay. By assuming the 
traditional position of the perspective painter who gazes at the world through a squared grid, 
Sebald makes an argument about the discriminating power of structured, distant vision. As 
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we are told, the total immersion in space and history gained through his perambulations has 
condemned the narrator to a form of paralysis. It is significant that the path to recovery and to 
writing begins with a taking of distance from the onslaught of impressions, and with the 
filtering of experience through a pre-formed, regular scheme symbolized by the netted 
window. But what does the window show? The familiar Norwich cityscape, seen from the 
vantage point of the hospital tower, appears to the narrator “an utterly alien place” devoid of 
life, akin to “a sea of stone or a field of rubble” (Hulse 5). Sebald acknowledges that this 
wider, more distanced perspective confirms what the ground-level investigation had already 
revealed: that the human world is but an expanse of ruins, the result of planned or natural 
destruction. For Andreas Huyssen, Sebald’s reticence to name the root cause or even 
distinguish between human actions and natural processes “remains too closely tied to 
metaphysics and to the apocalyptic philosophy of history so prominent in the German 
tradition” (156). But arguably Sebald’s multifaceted narrative is geared to avoid just that, by 
constantly shifting the point of view from a detached height which encompasses all things in 
an abstract spatio-temporal whole, to a troubling proximity to the fragments and memories of 
history’s ruins. Adopting a strategy comparable to that of Magris’ Danube, Sebald’s prose 
moves incessantly between close-ups and sovereign point of view, signaling the ambiguities 
underlying the intellectual and emotional investigation of the past, just as it refuses to settle 
for either resignation or mystification.  
To conclude the triptych, I now turn to Orhan Pamuk’s homage to his native city in 
Istanbul: Memories and the City. As Sebald and Magris, Pamuk is preoccupied with place 
and memory, and with finding a position from which to observe and narrate the past that is 
not subjected to the limitations of a static, totalizing perspective yet also free from the 
dangers of extreme relativism. Images are present in the text, but they have less of a 
mysterious aura than in Die Ringe des Saturn: authors and sources are duly credited in an 
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appendix at the end of the book. Pamuk’s largely autobiographical account is an amalgam of 
memoir, literary reminiscences, and anecdotes of Istanbul history. Sebald’s saturnine mood 
and Magris’ nostalgia find a match in Pamuk’s musings on the distinctive melancholy of 
Istanbul and its inhabitants, whom he represents as being caught between the fading Ottoman 
past and the borrowed clothes of Western modernity. “The great drive to Westernise,” he 
writes, “amounted mostly to an erasure of the past” (27). Inspired by a mixture of self-
loathing and ambition, the Republican elite to which Pamuk’s own family belonged was keen 
to disentangle itself from memories of the fallen empire and caliphate, but continued to live 
among the remains of the wreckage, neglected yet haunting. The fragmentary survival of this 
unwanted past is symbolized by the bibelots and alaturca music filling the drawing room of 
the narrator’s severe grandmother, and by features of the cityscape such as the ruined city 
walls, abandoned dervish lodges, traditional Ottoman wooden houses, and the impressive 
waterfront yalıs, once the residence of rich Pashas and now decrepit ruins falling prey to fires. 
These rotting structures confer on the city a characteristic “end-of-empire melancholy” that 
Pamuk has termed hüzün. 
Erdag Göknar traces the origins of Pamuk’s hüzün in “a trajectory from an external 
European gaze to an internal attempt at authenticity, which conceals/belies the internalized 
orientalism of Republican modernity” (231). Indeed, a big part of Istanbul is about seeing the 
city, and in particular about the gaze of Western travellers. Contrary to what might be 
expected, Pamuk does not reject the gaze of this overbearing “Other.” Instead, he engages 
with Western representations and embraces the possibility they gave of complementing or 
reversing the autochthonous point of view. Midway through the book, the narrator feels the 
need to justify the comparative absence of Turkish authors from his densely intertextual 
narrative: “Why this fixation with the thoughts of Western travellers?,” he wonders. By way 
of an answer, he talks ecstatically of his passion for writers such as Nerval, Flaubert, and the 
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Italian writer Edmondo de Amicis, explaining how he forged his own identity and image of 
Istanbul through their works.  
 
Especially when reading the Western travellers of the nineteenth century – perhaps 
because they wrote about familiar things in words I could easily understand – I realise 
that “my city” is not really mine. Just as it is when I am contemplating the skyline 
from the angles most familiar to me – from Galata and Cihangir, where I am writing 
these lines – so it is, too, when I see the city through the words and images of 
Westerners who saw it before me. (261)  
 
Comparing reading and writing to optical perspective, Pamuk describes the peculiar cognitive 
experience of holding different points of view simultaneously. The familiar is denaturalized 
in such a away that leads the reader (and the narrator himself) to interrogate the relationship 
between seeing and knowing, and between reality and its representation. The window is  
a typical device used in perspective treatises to illustrate perspectiva naturalis, that is, 
theories about how light affects the way the human eye sees (Elkins 46). Pamuk’s window, 
however, turns out to disrupt the illusion of transparency. Nothing would seem more local 
and particular than the view from one’s own room. Even so, the window frame does not 
impose “Cartesian coordinates” to the visual space nor does it relegate the observer to a fixed 
position. On the contrary, it provides an opportunity to escape such placement.  
In a related passage at the beginning of the book, Pamuk warns the reader that he will 
not take advantage of the grammatical possibility of Turkish to distinguish between hearsay 
and what one has actually experienced by using different verbal tenses, as he believes such a 
distinction is irrelevant, or even impossible (8). In light of such remarks, Istanbul has often 
been interpreted as championing the view that there is no historical truth, but always a variety 
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of different, competing, but ultimately interchangeable points of view. Some critics have 
gone as far as denying that “there is a unified urban space called Istanbul” (Edwards and 
Grauulund, 180). But if we consider Pamuk’s statements about the influence of Western 
travellers, we will see that not all representations are the same, and that some have more 
explanatory power than others.  
Chapter Seven of the book is entirely devoted to the painter and architect Antoine 
Ignace Melling, whose book of engravings with views of Constantinople is a source of 
constant fascination for the narrator. These engravings, we are told, are unique in that unlike 
other Western artists depicting Istanbul, Melling does not adopt an all-encompassing 
perspective that crushes the human figures, but gives a sense of horizontal movement, taking 
the viewer through a gradual process of discovery of the city’s complex geography. Deeply 
acquainted with Ottoman life, yet schooled in Western techniques of representation, 
Melling’s approach to Istanbul resonates with Pamuk’s own: “Melling’s is an insider’s point 
of view...Because he saw the city as an Istanbullu, but painted it like a clear-eyed Westerner, 
Melling’s Istanbul is not only a place graced by hills, mosques and landmarks we can 
recognise, but a place of sublime beauty” (67). Pamuk sees in Melling a kind of alter ego, a 
transitional figure between his particular East and the literary West, whose work combines 
local content with a foreign form. The experience of incongruity is not constructed in terms 
of a clash between European “modernity” and Turkish “backwardness,” nor explained away 
by a post-structuralist relativism that assumes that the real problem has to do with the 
inadequacies of the European perspective. Instead, that experience must ultimately be 
attributed to a constitutive paradox of the Turkish social order as Pamuk sees it: a project of 
modernization and national self-affirmation, conceived in imitation of the West, which 
alienates Turks from their own local reality and traditions. It is thus the fate of modern 
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Turkish culture to interpret its own reality with alien methodologies, and recognize itself in 
the “foreign air” of Melling’s engravings.  
Recently, Dominick LaCapra, a historian whose work is heavily invested in ideas of 
identity and trauma, has raised questions about the role of participatory engagement in 
historical understanding, noting how unchecked identification can pose a barrier to careful 
enquiry and contextualization. As counterbalance, LaCapra proposes “an internally 
dialogized mode of discourse involving varying degrees of proximity and distance” (29). 
Pamuk’s narrative brings this internal dialogue from the level of intercultural, interpersonal 
relations down to the individual psyche. For the narrator-figure, European ideas are not just 
some inessential, abstract notions that are alien to the reality of Istanbul. Instead, they form 
an important part of his “local” identity, to the point that he claims: “whenever I sense the 
absence of Western eyes, I become my own Westerner” (260). What is truly Turkish, then, is 
neither the Ottoman heritage nor European modernity, but the distortion and manipulation of 
both, which is best represented through a fluid, shifting point of view.  
Magris and his stories of the twisting Danube; the uncanny connections unveiled by 
Sebald’s narrator; and Pamuk’s double vision on Istanbul – they are easily read as enacting a 
confusion of self and other that defies understanding. Yet, as I hope to have shown, 
scepticism of pseudo-natural systems such as linear perspective in their case stops short of 
unchecked relativism. Through the ambiguous positioning of their viewers/narrators, Magris, 
Sebald and Pamuk question the myth of transparency and objectivity of positivist 
historiography. But even if they choose not to assign the viewer a single ideal place, their 
relentless search for the right standpoint from which the historical landscape can be reliably 
represented produces a kind of “comparative” objectivity. The peripatetic narratives of 
Danube, The Rings of Saturn, and Istanbul adopt perspectival representations as a figurative 
template for identifying and comparing the various intellectual standpoints from which the 
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past may be surveyed and explained. Without subscribing to either naïve realism or neo-
skepticism, Magris, Sebald and Pamuk attempt to create a third path. What they propose is a 
dynamic approach that allows for multiple viewpoints while still grounding them within a 
stable frame of reference. By rejecting the disembodied, universal eye supposedly required 
by “classical” representation, they restore some of the flexibility that perspective had before 
the twentieth century fossilized it into a hyper-rational instrument of domination. Where 
competing viewpoints are allowed to interact in a meaningful dialogue, perspective becomes 
a way to democratize rather than centralize control. Momigliano’s ultimate line of defense 
against the postmodern brand of historicism was a shared ethical code or “moral conscience” 
which requires the historian to do research and to “do it well” (67). Following Momigliano, 
Carlo Ginzburg transfers authority from the inner forum of individual conscience to the 
sphere of public discourse. In Thread and Traces, Ginzburg remarks that “what has made 
perspective into such a powerful cognitive metaphor [is] the tension between subjective point 
of view and objective and verifiable truths…If this tension can only be kept open, the notion 
of perspective will cease to be a stumbling block…and become instead a space to meet – a 
square where we can converse, discuss, and disagree” (156). The problems attending 
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